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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

SECURITIES-IN
TION

U.S.

PARI DELICTO DEFENSE MAY BAR RECOVERY IN SEC-

12(1) ACTION UNDER SECURITIES ACT OF 1933. Pinter v. Dahl,
-,

-

108 S. Ct. 2063, 100 L. Ed. 2d 658 (1988).

Maurice Dahl purchased a $310,000 undivided interest in oil and gas
leases from Billy Pinter after Dahl had toured drilling sites and reviewed
production histories. When Dahl apprised a number of friends and relatives
of his investment, each decided to invest $7,500 in the drilling venture. The
purchasers subscribed to an agreement which warned that the oil and gas
lease had not been registered pursuant to section 12(1) of the Securities Act
of 1933 as required by law. Dahl aided fellow investors in completing the
form, which set out the subscription agreement. When the venture failed,
Dahl and the other investors sought rescission of the agreement and return
of the purchase price based on Pinter's failure to register the securities.
Pinter contended that Dahl's active solicitation, coupled with his knowledge
that the leases were unregistered, rendered him in paridelicto (at equal fault)
and barred his recovery. In addition, Pinter urged that Dahl be realigned as
a defendant for the purpose of contribution.
The federal district court ruled that the in pari delicto defense did not bar
Dahl's recovery and concluded that Pinter did not qualify for a registration
exemption because the securities sale did not meet the requirements for a
private offering. Additionally, the court refused to deem Dahl a seller and
hold him responsible for contribution. On appeal, a divided fifth circuit affirmed, holding that section 12(1) of the 1933 Securities Act created strict
liability for Pinter and that the in pari delicto defense would be effective only
if Dahl's actions were "offensive to the dictates of natural justice." The
court also rejected Pinter's claim that Dahl was a "seller" and refused to
subject Dahl to contribution unless he received some type of benefit from his
solicitations. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the in pari delicto defense was applicable in a section 12(1)
action when a purchaser of unregistered nonexempt securities sought rescission of the agreement and return of the purchase price. Held: Vacated and

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

1

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 20 [2022], No. 2, Art. 10

ST MAR Y'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 20:489

remanded. The in pari delicto defense may bar recovery in a section 12(1)
action if the purchaser was equally responsible for the conduct which caused
the illegal sale of unregistered securities and the purchaser's role was primarily that of promoter, not investor.
The majority reached this conclusion by utilizing a two prong test created
by the Court in a previous securities case which determined the applicability
of the in paridelicto defense in a section 10(b) action: whether the purchaser
was at equal fault for the conduct from which he seeks redress and whether
preclusion of his recovery would offend the Securities Act's objectives of protecting the investor. Writing for the majority, Justice Blackmun addressed
the first prong and concluded that equal fault only existed if Dahl was
equally responsible for Pinter's failure to either register the securities prior to
their offering or comply with the registration exemption provisions. Under
the second prong, the preclusion of recovery enhances the objective of protecting investors only if the purchaser's dominant role is that of a promoter,
not investor. In contrast, when a purchaser's promotional activities are
merely incidental to his role as investor, the Court would not preclude recovery based on the in paridelicto defense. The Court reasoned that preclusion
would frustrate the objectives of the 1933 Act, because it is designed to protect the investor from making uninformed decisions regarding investments.
Traditionally, the in paridelicto defense bars recovery only in the limited
situation where the individual who brings the suit bears substantial equal
fault for his injury. See Pinterv. Dahl, -

U.S.

-,

-,

108 S. Ct. 2063, 2070-

71, 100 L. Ed. 2d 658, 672 (1988); Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v.
Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 306-07 (1985). This common law defense is based
upon two principles: first, the judiciary should not waste its resources on
resolving disputes between wrongdoers; and second, unacceptable conduct
will be deterred if wrongdoers are denied judicial relief. See Bateman Eichler, 472 U.S. at 306. The United States Supreme Court has warned against
allowing common law defenses that bar recovery when a private suit serves
an important public interest. See Perma Life Mufflers Inc. v. International
Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 138 (1968). In Perma Life, the Court criticized
the lower court's use of the in pari delicto defense as applied to an express
cause of action under the antitrust laws. See id. The Court prohibited this
equitable defense, allowing recovery by the plaintiffs although they significantly contributed to their own injury. See id. at 139-40. Noting that Congress had not intended to incorporate the in paridelicto defense in antitrust
suits, the Court did not address whether its analysis was applicable to federal
securities law. See id. at 138, 140.
Encouraged by conflicting circuit decisions, the Supreme Court in Eichler
addressed the application of the in pari delicto defense in the context of securities litigation, specifically, a section 10(b) suit. Compare Tarasi v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank, 555 F.2d 1152, 1164 (3d Cir.)(allowing defense), cert.
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denied, 434 U.S. 965 (1977) and Malamphy v. Real-Tex Enters., Inc., 527
F.2d 978, 980 (4th Cir. 1974)(sustaining submission of in paridelicto to jury)
with Woolf v. S.D. Cohn & Co., 515 F.2d 591, 604 (5th Cir. 1975)(rejecting
defense on specific facts), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 426 U.S.
994 (1976) and Kirkland v. E.F Hutton & Co., 564 F. Supp. 427, 433-47
(E.D. Mich. 1983)(rejecting in pari delicto defense in summary judgment
motion); see also Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78j(b) (1982)(creating cause of action where intentional material misrepresentations or omissions accompany sale of securities). In Eichler, the plaintiff received false inside information and brought suit based on section 10(b)
of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act against the insider who sold him the
security. See Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299,
301 (1985). The insider defended by contending that reliance on inside information was unlawful and the plaintiff was therefore in paridelicto. See id.
at 312. After the Court formulated and applied a two prong test, recovery
was allowed despite the plaintiff's unlawful use of inside information. Id. at
319. The first prong of the Court's test was based on the traditional element
of equal fault while the second prong focused on whether precluding recovery would interfere with the objectives of protecting the investing public.
See id. at 310-11. In applying this test, the Court reasoned that the plaintiff's duty to refrain from using inside information was derivative of the insider's duty to keep privileged confidences. See id. at 313-14; see also Dirks
v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 659 (1983)(duty of insider is derivative). Thus, if the
duty of Eichler's plaintiff was derivative of and less than the duty of an insider, the possibility for equal culpability could not exist. See Eichler, 472
U.S. at 313. Addressing the second prong, the Court concluded that objectives of the Act were furthered if the plaintiff was protected as an investor by
allowing recovery. See id. at 315.
Although courts have held that investors do not relinquish the shelter of
the Securities Act when they become in pari delicto with sellers, the Eichler
Court neither indicates nor suggests the possible context in which the in pari
delicto defense may bar recovery in a section 12(1) action under the Securities Act of 1933. See Can-Am Petroleum Co. v. Beck, 331 F.2d 371, 373
(10th Cir. 1964)(allowing recovery where investor's role adulterated by promotional activity); see also Securities Act of 1933, § 12(1), 15 U.S.C. § 771
(1982)(seller of unregistered securities liable for purchase price). The Dahl
Court, however, extended this equitable defense to a section 12(1) strict liability cause of action and clarified the circumstances under which it is appropriate to hold a plaintiff in pari delicto. See Pinter v. Dahl,-

U.S.___.

-,

108

S. Ct. 2063, 1072-75, 100 L. Ed. 2d 638, 673-77 (1988).
Initially, when examining Eichler's first prong, attention is given to
whether the purchaser equally contributed to the issuer's failure to comply
with registration requirements by failing to properly register the securities or
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meet the requirements for a registration exemption. See id. This determination is based on how the purchaser cooperated in planning and developing
the distributional scheme of the unregistered securities. See id. at -, 108 S.
Ct. at 2073-74, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 676; see also Lawler v. Gilliam, 569 F.2d
1283, 1292 (4th Cir. 1978)(defense disallowed because plaintiff unaware of
scheme to defraud investors); Malamphy v. Real-Tex Enters., Inc., 527 F.2d
978, 980 (4th Cir. 1975)(defense allowed because plaintiff actively distributed and convinced others to purchase).
In a section 12(1) action, the second prong of Eichler is satisfied if the
purchaser who offers or sells the unregistered securities takes on the role of a
promoter rather than merely an investor. See Pinter v. Dahl, - U.S. at __,
108 S. Ct. at 2074, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 677. However, even when a purchaser
has actively participated in selling or offering unregistered securities, the
purchaser will not be barred from recovery when the promotional efforts are
merely incidental to the role as investor. See id. Compare Can-Am Petroleum Co. v. Beck, 331 F.2d 371, 373-74 (10th Cir. 1964)(naive investor's
culpability not equal to seller's culpability despite promotional activities)
with Athas v. Day, 186 F. Supp. 385, 389 (D. Colo. 1960)(precluding recovery because plaintiff extensively participated in illegal securities distribution). See generally Ruder, Multiple Defendant in Securities Law Fraud
Cases: Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, In Pari Delicto, Indemnification,
and Contribution, 120 U. Pa. L. Rev. 597, 662-63 (1972)(defense rejected if
promotional activities incidental to investing). Whether the purchaser is an
investor or a promoter rests upon a myriad of facts which include the financial involvement of the purchaser as compared to solicited third parties, the
purchaser's role in developing the distributional plans of the offering, and
the nature of the benefit for any of these services. See Pinter,- U.S. at -,
108 S. Ct. at 2074-75, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 677; see also Malamphy v. Real-Tex
Enters., Inc., 527 F.2d 978, 980 (4th Cir. 1975)(barring recovery where
plaintiff received large commissions for promotional expertise); Can-Am Petroleum, 331 F.2d at 373-74 (disallowing defense noting incidental nature of
investor's promotional solicitations). These factors are not exhaustive and
the courts are given broad discretion to determine the extent and nature of
the promotional activity in each instance. See Pinter, -

U.S. at

__,

108 S.

Ct. at 2074-75, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 677; see also Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 412
F.2d 700, 704 (5th Cir. 1969)(courts have discretion in application of in pari
delicto defense).
The Fifth Circuit failed to recognize these factors which determine the
outcome of the two prong test. See Dahl v. Pinter, 787 F.2d 985, 987 (5th
Cir. 1986)(defense permissible only if Dahl's conduct offensive to natural
justice). Relying on the absence of a private placement exemption, the court
of appeals rejected Pinter's in paridelicto defense and distinguished the section 10(b) action in Eichler from the section 12(1) action in Dahl. See id. at
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988 (in pari delicto unavailable); see also Henderson v. Hayden, 461 F.2d
1069, 1072 (5th Cir. 1972)(allowing sophisticated investor recovery if exemption not proven). This distinction emphasizes that section 10(b), which
renders the use of deceptive practices in the sale of securities unlawful, required a degree of intent. See id.; see also Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
§ 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982). Because a section 12(1) action under the
Securities Act of 1933 does not require intent for recovery, the Fifth Circuit
concluded that section 12(1) recovery was nearly absolute. See Dahl, 787
F.2d at 988 (violation of section 12(1) strict liability offense); see also Raiford
v. Buslease, Inc., 825 F.2d 351, 354 (11th Cir. 1987)(imposing strict liability
in section 12(1) action); Lawler v. Gilliam, 569 F.2d 1283, 1285 (4th Cir.
1978)(section 12(1) virtually creates absolute liability).
Although Perma Life and Eichler applied a narrow reading of the equitable in pari delicto defense, this defense is not antiquated. Courts have long
recognized equitable defenses in strict liability actions such as section 12(1)
suits under the 1933 Securities Act. See Pinter v. Dahl, - U.S. ____,
, 108 S.
Ct. 2063, 2072, 100 L. Ed. 2d 658, 673-74 (1988). Although stressing the
importance of deterring wrongdoing, the Dahl Court recognized situations
in which barring recovery is a more effective way to promote statutory ends.
See Pinter,- U.S. at -, 108 S. Ct. at 2072, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 674. Accordingly, the Dahl Court continued the narrow application of the in pari delicto
defense in Perma Life and Eichler by describing the limited circumstances
which satisfy Eichler's two prong test in a section 12(1) context. See id. at
-, 108 S. Ct. at 2072-75, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 673-77.
Prior to Eichler, some courts barred recovery from an insider in a section
10(b) action. See, e.g., Tarasi v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank, 555 F.2d 1152, 1164
(3d Cir.)(allowing defense to bar recovery), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 965 (1977);
Malamphy v. Real-Tex Enters., Inc., 527 F.2d 978, 980 (4th Cir. 1975)(sustaining submission of in paridelicto to jury); Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 412
F.2d 700, 704-05 (5th Cir. 1969)(allowing in pari delicto defense). Subsequent to the denial of in paridelicto in Eichler, courts have been reluctant to
bar recovery when a defendant has failed to comply with registration requirements. See Dahl v. Pinter,787 F.2d 985, 988 (5th Cir. 1986)(holding in
pari delicto defense unavailable); Wolken v. Erck, 421 N.W.2d 63, 64 (S.D.
1988)(applying Eichler logic to allow recovery). Where Eichler overrules the
line of cases which denied recovery to one who relied on inside information,
Dahl does not overrule cases which deny the in pari delicto defense to purchasers of unregistered securities. Compare Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards,
Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 319 (1985)(allowing recovery to investors using
inside information) and Rothberg v. Rosenbloom, 628 F. Supp. 746, 756
(E.D. Pa. 1986)(Eichler rejects Tarasi rationale which barred insider's recovery) with Pinter v. Dahl, - U.S. -, -, 108 S. Ct. 2063, 2074, 100 L. Ed. 2d
658, 677 (1988)(promotional activities permissible if incidental to role of in-
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vestor) and Can-Am Petroleum Co. v. Beck, 331 F.2d 371, 373-74 (5th Cir.
1964)(refusing to bar investor who actively sold to others). Instead, Dahl
recognizes that the facts in each case must be analyzed to ascertain the applicability of the in pari delicto defense and prescribes the test formulated in
Eichler as the guide for this determination. See Pinter, -

U.S. at

__,

108 S.

Ct. at 2073-74, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 676.
Even though Dahl has given lower courts freedom to bar section 12(1)
recovery via the in pari delicto defense, the Court has not abandoned its
narrow application of the defense set forth in Perma Life and Eichler. In
future section 12(1) actions, the in pari delicto defense is applicable only in
limited situations where the two prong Eichler test is satisfied. Because Dahl
requires the purchaser's extensive participation in the offering beyond that of
a mere investor to trigger the use of the in pari delicto defense, the decision
does not give broad protection to sellers of securities. Rather, the decision
grants sellers limited permission to use this equitable defense in an otherwise
strict liability cause of action.
G. Barton Chucker
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